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Abstract

In 2009, the author wrote an article on the Self-Incrimination Clause. In response to this article, Professors
Cribari and Judges wrote a Response suggesting that the author was an abolitionist of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. This article is intended to clarify the author's position on the Self-Incrimination Clause and on Griffin
v. California. The article begins by explaining the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause and highlighting
the differences between the right to testify and the right to remain silent. It then analyzes the "test the
prosecution" reasoning for the Griffin rule, pointing out its shortcomings and lack of Constitutional basis. The
article continues by critiquing the argument that Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, which describes the
various values served by the Self-Incrimination Clause, gives several reasons to uphold the Griffin rule. The
article concludes by summing up the policy reasons for abandoning the Griffin rule and attempting legal
reform in another way.
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Reply

On Silence:
A Reply to Professors Cribari and Judges
Ted Sampsell-Jones†
INTRODUCTION
I thank Professors Cribari and Judges for taking the time
to respond to Making Defendants Speak.1 Their Response,
Speaking of Silence,2 makes many thoughtful and impassioned
arguments. To a substantial extent, however, their Response is
not directed at me, but rather at the likes of Judge Henry
Friendly3 and Professor Albert Alschuler,4 who have offered
more thoroughgoing critiques of the Self-Incrimination Clause
itself. Cribari and Judges characterize me as an “abolitionist,”5
and suggest that my “real aim” is the Self-Incrimination Clause
itself.6 In that respect, they misread my article. I do not propose outright repeal; rather, in addition to other proposals that
do not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause, I propose overruling Griffin v. California.7 In my view, the Griffin rule
represents an unwise and constitutionally unwarranted judicial

†
Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks
to Gregory Duhl for his suggestions. Copyright © 2010 by Ted Sampsell-Jones.
1. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1327, 1327 (2009).
2. Donald P. Judges & Stephen J. Cribari, Speaking of Silence: A Response to
Making Defendants Speak, 94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 11 (2009), http://www
.minnesotalawreview.org/sites/default/files/Judges_Cribari_Speaking_of_Silence
.pdf.
3. See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 674 –77 (1968).
4. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective:
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631 (1996).
5. Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 39.
6. Id.
7. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause
prohibits instructions and comments suggesting that an adverse inference can
be drawn from a defendant’s silence).
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extension of the Clause, so it should be abandoned. But abandoning Griffin does not mean abandoning the core right itself.
The Self-Incrimination Clause, at its core, prohibits the use
of torture to obtain confessions from a suspected criminal.8 It
also prohibits the use of imprisonment and contempt sanctions
to compel a suspect to offer testimonial evidence against himself.9 The Griffin rule—which prohibits adverse inferences from
silence at trial10—is, in my view, a peripheral extension of the
right to remain silent. I propose lopping off that judicially
created extension, but I do not thereby propose to abolish it.
To use a (very) rough sports metaphor, think of the two polar rights—the right to testify and the right to remain silent—
as the opposite end zones of a football field. Between the end
zones, there is a large field that provides room for play with
various legal rules that affect a defendant’s decision to testify
or remain silent. Currently, the line of scrimmage is set at the
forty-yard line closest to the silence end zone. I propose moving
the line of scrimmage to the opposite forty-yard line. I do not
propose moving the ball all the way to the end zone. There are
important values underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause, but
there are competing values as well. The current body of American case law represents an attempt (though not an explicit or
thoughtful attempt) to balance competing values. I think that
the current balance is a bit off, while Cribari and Judges appear to think that the current balance is about right.
More concretely, their defense of Griffin has two main
threads. First, they argue that Griffin is justified by a “test the
prosecution” theory of modern criminal trial11 and also by the
Self-Incrimination Clause itself.12 Second, they argue that Griffin is justified by intuitions about what prosecution practices
are reasonable and appropriate.13 For the reasons that follow, I
find neither argument persuasive. Ultimately, I suspect their
defense of Griffin has little to do with any interpretive theory of
the Self-Incrimination Clause. Rather, Cribari and Judges
seem to be motivated by a sense that the modern criminal jus8. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2651 (explaining that the history
of the Self-Incrimination Clause indicates that it was designed to prohibit
coercive interrogation techniques, including torture).
9. See id.
10. 380 U.S. at 615.
11. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 13.
12. See id. at 14 –15.
13. See id. at 36–37.
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tice system is unfair to criminal defendants, and thus that any
change that would benefit the state must be resisted. By contrast, I conclude that maintaining Griffin does nothing to remedy the injustices or iniquities of contemporary criminal law.
I. “TESTING THE PROSECUTION”
Cribari and Judges argue that the expansive modern police
state—and the resulting “test the prosecution” theory of modern trial—necessitates the Griffin rule.14 They reject the use of
history to guide interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause
because the criminal justice system has changed so dramatically since the Founding Era.15 They argue that the expansion in
the state’s power to prosecute over the last two centuries justifies new offsetting rights—rights needed to test the state’s
case—and that Griffin is one such right.16
Their argument has several shortcomings. To begin with, it
rests on an overwrought historical story. They suggest that
over the last two centuries, the American criminal law has been
transformed from a small, somewhat idyllic system into an Orwellian leviathan.17 But the history of American criminal law is
not a history of relentless linear expansion. Indeed, in many
ways, the criminal law is narrower in scope than it was in the
past. States impose the death penalty less frequently and for
fewer crimes.18 Many “morals” crimes have been deregulated.19
The overall numbers of criminal prosecutions and prisoners
have risen dramatically, of course, but that is in large part because crime rates themselves have risen dramatically.20 Murder was illegal in 1791 as it is today; what has changed is that

14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 15–16.
16. See id. at 48.
17. See id. at 26 (“The extensive and complex web of today’s federal, state,
and local criminal laws, and malum prohibitum regulatory provisions enforced
by criminal sanctions, would have been unimaginable in the eighteenth century.”).
18. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 42–44 (discussing the imposition of capital punishment in colonial
America against repeat offenders and for crimes including, but not limited to,
rape and murder).
19. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86
TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007) (arguing that the standard historical story that
there has been a relentless increase in the scope of the criminal law is a myth).
20. See id. at 267 (explaining that the increase in incarceration rates derives from decisions to punish offenders more severely).

2010]

ON SILENCE

97

people do it more often.21 Thankfully, the state has increased
the supply of murder prosecutions to match the growth in demand. Such expansion does not provide any justification for altering the scope of defendants’ procedural rights.
History aside, the “test the prosecution” theory of defendants’ rights does not offer a cogent account of the wide variety
of procedural and evidentiary rules that characterize the contemporary criminal justice system. To begin with, it is not even
clear whether the “test the prosecution” label can be sensibly
applied to Griffin or many of the other procedural protections
afforded to defendants. Some rights are sensibly called “testing” rights. The right of confrontation, for example, allows a defendant to test the prosecution’s case by cross-examining the
prosecution’s witnesses. But the Self-Incrimination Clause does
not allow a defendant to test anything—rather, it allows a defendant to withhold evidence that the prosecution might otherwise be able to obtain and admit at trial. Even at the level of
characterization, calling Griffin a “test the prosecution” rule is
awkward.
Even setting aside such qualms about labels, the “test the
prosecution” theory is inadequate because it cannot explain
why we have certain testing practices rather than others.
Wouldn’t a beyond any doubt standard test the prosecution better than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard? If so, why do
we have the latter instead of the former? Wouldn’t a defendant
be better able to test the prosecution if the state were required
to disclose every detail of its case well in advance of trial? And
wouldn’t a defendant be better able to test the prosecution if he
were not required to make any pretrial disclosures at all? If so,
how can contemporary discovery practices be reconciled with
the “test the prosecution” theory?
We could draft and propose countless new legal rules that
would help criminal defendants test the prosecution’s case. But
many such rules would not be sensible. Some rules that test the
prosecution are justified, but others are not, in part because
their cost would be too high. Even as a policy matter, therefore,
a rule, such as the Griffin rule,22 cannot be justified simply by
noting that it helps defendants to “test the prosecution.” The
“test the prosecution” theory offered by Cribari and Judges is so

21. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 270 (describing that the number of
prisoners has increased since the 1900s).
22. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
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vague that it offers no real guidance about which practices
should be adopted and which should not.
As a legal matter, moreover, it is difficult to tie the “test
the prosecution” theory to our constitutional text. The Constitution does not say “in all criminal cases, the accused shall enjoy the right to test the prosecution’s case.” Instead, it grants to
criminal defendants a set of particular procedural rights—such
as the right to confront witnesses, the right to the assistance of
counsel, and the right to a jury trial.23 Cribari and Judges
might deride me as a formalist,24 but I maintain that the Griffin rule is constitutionally required if and only if it is mandated
by some actual provision of the Constitution.25 Asserting that
the Griffin rule helps to “test the prosecution” does little to answer the constitutional question.26
II. REASON AND INTUITION
Many legal rules exist that would help defendants test the
prosecution, and many practices exist that would at least arguably implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause. Ultimately, an interpretive theory must provide some framework to help decide
which practices are permissible and which are not. My framework begins with the text of the Clause itself, and attempts to
analyze which practices constitute “compulsion.” I propose that
we should measure compulsion by reference to generally applicable rules of evidence and procedure. Applying that framework, I conclude that an adverse inference drawn from silence
at trial does not constitute compulsion. Cribari and Judges, by
contrast, simply refer to the various values (drawn from Murphy27) that can be said to underlie the Clause, and analyze

23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST
DIVIDE 161 (2010) (describing how jurists often use the term “formalist” as “a
term of abuse with no real theoretical content”).
25. Professors Cribari and Judges also argue that Griffin is “consistent”
with a “robust right to remain silent.” See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at
37. I suppose I have no quarrel with that proposition, but the relevant question is whether the Griffin rule is mandated by the Self-Incrimination Clause.
26. Cf. Eric A. Posner, The Decider, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 11, 2010,
http://www.tnr/com/print/book/review/the-decider (“Abstract propositions about
human values cannot decide cases.”).
27. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 56 n.5 (1964) (describing the various values served by the Self-Incrimination Clause).

2010]

ON SILENCE

99

whether the use of an adverse inference would undermine
those values.28
But just as their “test the prosecution” approach offers no
concrete interpretive guidance, their appeal to Murphy’s values
offers no concrete interpretive guidance. Murphy is a pastiche.
It lists a myriad of different “fundamental values” and “noble
aspirations” which the Self-Incrimination Clause is said to further.29 Some of the “values” are exceedingly vague—I struggle
to find any actual semantic content in phrases like “respect for
the inviolability of the human personality.”30 An approach
based on Murphy risks quick degeneration into sloganeering.
And again, while there are innumerable legal practices that
implicate the diffuse Murphy values to at least some extent, only some of those practices actually violate the SelfIncrimination Clause. Even if the Murphy values provide an
appropriate starting point, we would still need some framework
for deciding which of those practices are unconstitutional and
which are not. Cribari and Judges do not provide any such
framework. Instead, they suggest that we may rely on intuition.
When it comes to Griffin, their intuition does not match my
own. Our debate is about whether a prosecutor may stand up in
closing and say: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in addition
to the other evidence of guilt, you should consider the fact that
the defendant has declined to testify.” While such an argument
might not be very strong as an evidentiary matter, it does not
strike me as being particularly unseemly or demeaning.31 If
forced to debate in Murphy’s dissolute and wandering terms, I
would have to say that I do not intuit any disrespect for the inviolability of the human personality in such a closing argument.
But intuition is a sorry substitute for law. Intuition alone
cannot justify Griffin or anything else. Constitutional adjudication requires more than intuition—it requires reason.
The scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not easy to
define, and application of the Clause in modern criminal law
raises a variety of difficult and debatable questions about various investigatory and evidentiary practices. May the state
28. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 29–37.
29. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55, 56 n.5.
30. Id. at 55.
31. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 36–37 (characterizing adverse
inferences as “unseemly”).
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compel a defendant to answer questions on cross-examination
once he has testified on direct? May the state compel a defendant to turn over documents or other physical evidence?32 May
the state compel a suspect to answer questions if it gives him
only testimonial, rather than transactional, immunity?33 The
Supreme Court’s case law must answer these questions and
give legal reasons for its answers. The Court cannot strike
down a legal rule as unconstitutional simply by calling it “unseemly.”
CONCLUSION
Judging by the tenor of Speaking of Silence, I suspect that
Cribari and Judges are not much concerned with any arguments about the text, history, and structure of the Constitution. Their arguments are more extralegal than legal. Their defense of Griffin draws much of its rhetorical force from the
emotional picture they draw of the poor and lonely defendant
who faces the powerful and menacing state.34 It would be easy
to respond in kind with an emotional appeal about the horrible
toll that crime takes on victims, and about the necessity of deterring, punishing, and incapacitating the men (and occasional
women) who commit crime. But that road leads nowhere good.
After all, Cribari and Judges are correct that the contemporary American criminal justice system is awesome in its
scope and in its power. The sheer number of incarcerated
American citizens—which presently hovers above two million35—is staggering. Even considering our high crime rates,
our incarceration rates are indefensible.36
32. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should reconsider its doctrine that the Clause
only applies to “testimonial” evidence).
33. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972) (holding that
testimony can be compelled from a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment
by conferring immunity from use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived from it in subsequent criminal proceedings).
34. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 35–36.
35. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
228417, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 1 (2009); see also John Schwartz, Report Finds
States Holding Fewer Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A15 (noting
that state and federal prisons currently hold approximately 1.6 million people,
and local jails currently hold approximately 700,000).
36. See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3–6 (2003)
(analyzing the comparatively harsh sentencing practices of contemporary American criminal law).
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But it is important to locate the source of that problem.
The criminal justice system has different spheres. In one
sphere, substantive criminal law and sentencing law define
what acts are illegal and how much they are punished. In
another sphere, evidence law and criminal procedure create
and regulate our system for deciding whether an accused individual is guilty or not. The scope of the American criminal justice system is daunting, but that problem results from substantive law and sentencing law, not from evidence and procedure.
In other words, the problem is not that we are locking up many
innocent people, but that we are locking up guilty people for too
long. A better criminal justice system might have fewer crimes,
and it might have shorter sentences. But that question is independent of the diagnostic question—we should always strive to
have the most accurate system possible for determining who is
guilty and who is not.
Substantive law and sentencing law are predominantly political, while evidence law and procedure are more classically
legal. As lawyers, we have very little power over substantive
and sentencing law, but we have some power in the sphere of
evidence and procedure. It is tempting, as a means of protesting the injustices of substantive and sentencing law, to fight
any legal reform in evidence or procedure that would provide a
marginal benefit to the state. That temptation should be resisted. Maintaining a constitutionally shoddy rule like Griffin
does nothing to remedy the injustices of modern American
criminal law.

